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The Paper builds a simplified model describing the economy of a currency 
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characterizing the policy-making are similar to those in EMU. National 
governments choose the size of deficit taking into account the two main rules 
of the Stability and Growth Pact on public finance. Unlike previous literature 
the asymmetric working of those rules is explicitly modeled in order to identify 
its impact on the Nash equilibrium of deficits arising from a game of strategic 
interaction between fiscal authorities in the union. 
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Submitted 30 August 2004 1 Introduction and aim of the paper
An Economic and Monetary Union between twelve European countries has been
created in 1999. One of its crucial feature is the asymmetry between monetary
and ﬁscal policy. The former is fully centralized in the hands of the European
Central Bank, while the national governments keep their control over the latter.
Nonetheless a system of ﬁscal rules to which all participating countries are
subject has been set up: the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).
It implies three major requirements:
Running a nominal budget deﬁcit not larger than 3% of the country’s GDP.
Having an outstanding stock of government debt not larger than 60% of the
country’s GDP
Running a structural budget close to balance or in surplus1.
In case a country does not fulﬁll the 3% threshold an institutional procedure
is supposed to be triggered by the ECOFIN (the EU council of Finance Minis-
ters), culminating in the payment of ﬁnes by the country violating the rule, in
case no corrective measures are taken.
The basic rationale underneath the set-up of the pact is the fact that in
a monetary union with decentralized ﬁscal policy, cross-country spillovers of
government deﬁcit increase since, on one hand, it has a higher direct positive
impact on the partner’s output because of stronger trade links and, on the other,
a higher indirect negative impact on the same variable since higher national
deﬁcit means higher union-wide inﬂation to which the bank reacts with higher
interest rates for all the countries in the Union. This clearly leads to a more
severe problem of cross-country ﬁs c a le x t e r n a l i t yt h a ni na ne n v i r o n m e n tw i t h
national monetary policy2, thereby calling for some disciplining devices to help
countries internalizing it.
This paper builds up a simple model which provides a description of the
economy of a currency union and which incorporates the constraints of the
SGP in the objective function of the national ﬁscal policy-makers. The formu-
lation follows the one used in Governatori-Eijﬃnger (2004a) adding a crucial
feature: the asymmetric working of the pact’s rules, i.e. the fact that the two
constraints imply sanctions for the country only when it overcomes the cor-
responding threshold levels for deﬁcit, while no loss is incurred when deﬁcit
is lower than those thresholds. This set-up is used to investigate what is the
1The European Commission clariﬁed that this actually means the structural, or cyclically
adjusted, deﬁcit. This in turn means the balance net of the part due to the economic cycle,
i.e. to the working of the automatic stabilisers.
2In a normal setting of national monetary and ﬁscal policy, this cross-country spillovers
are strongly softened: the impact of higher deﬁcit on foreign output is indirect because of
trade restrictions, exchange rate risk, restriction on free movement of capital, which typically
vanish or are at least strongly lowered in a monetary union. As far as the inﬂation/interest
rate spillover is concerned, it is also lowered, since foreign monetary policy will just care about
foreign inﬂation and not the overall one of the Union.
2impact of this system of rules and sanctions on the budget deﬁcits of member
countries. In particular the aim is to identify how the SGP shapes the strategic
interaction between individual countries’ ﬁscal policy choices.
The paper is structured as follows.
The second section outlines the model with two countries making up a cur-
rency union, specifying how the SGP asymmetric rules enter the optimization
problem faced by each ﬁscal policy authority.
The third section outlines the procedure for solving the model and deter-
mining the potential equilibrium choices of deﬁcits by each country.
The fourth section rules out unfeasible equilibria and ﬁnds the ﬁscal best
response functions of the two countries, i.e. the equilibrium deﬁcit choice of one
country given each of the possible moves of the other.
The ﬁfth section ﬁnds the Nash equilibria of deﬁcit.
The sixth section performs some simulations and robustness analysis of the
ﬁndings previously identiﬁed.
The seventh section concludes.
2 The model
The model considers a two countries monetary union in which monetary policy
is decided by a single institution, while ﬁscal policy authority is retained by each
of the participating countries. The two countries are identical in every respect
except for their shares of the aggregate GDP of the union, which are ω for the
former and 1 − ω for the latter, with 0 <ω<1.
The model includes a demand curve which states that the output gap (mean-
ing actual minus potential GDP) of the whole currency union, yD, depends pos-
itively on the weighted average of the government deﬁcits of the two countries
(g1,g 2), expressed in terms of their national GDPs, and negatively on the cur-
rency union wide real interest rate, i−pe where the latter term is the expected
inﬂation rate.
yD = α[ωg1 +( 1− ω)g2] − β (i − pe) (1)
The supply curve is a Phillips curve whereby surprise inﬂation in the union
leads to an increase in the output gap, the rationale being the nominal rigidities
which are assumed to characterize the union’s markets:
yS = ϕ(p − pe) (2)
3We add the usual equilibrium condition:
yD = yS = y (3)
The monetary policy of the common central bank is represented by a Taylor
rule whereby the interest rate is exclusively set in order to reach the inﬂation
target of the bank, which for simplicity is set to p0 =0 .
i = δp (4)
The last equation links the total and structural budget deﬁc i to fe a c hc o u n t r y
(the latter being bi). Following Buti-Giudice (2002), the latter is the cyclically
adjusted deﬁcit, i.e. the total deﬁcit net of the part due to the cyclical situation
of the economy (hence, to the working of automatic stabilizers)3:
gi = bi − φy (5)
Where φ measures the cyclical sensitivity of the budget and it is assumed to
be equal for both countries.
All parameters are assumed to be between 0 and 1 except δ>1 in order to
rule out negative real interest rate.
Our aim is to solve the model for the optimal deﬁcit of the individual country.
The ﬁrst step is to identify the policy instrument which the ﬁscal authorities
can use, which is the structural budget deﬁcit. Once the latter is set by both
countries the total deﬁcits will be determined through the equilibrium output
g a po ft h eU n i o n .S ow eﬁrst express all total deﬁcits in the demand equation as
functions of the structural ones and the output gap, then we replace the Taylor
rule into the demand equation.
Then, the inﬂation rate is found through the output market equilibrium
condition:
α[ω (b1 − φy)+( 1− ω)(b2 − φy)] − β (δp− pe)=ϕ(p − pe) (6)
Solution is :
3In fact, we consider the Union’s economy to be in recession whenever the output gap is
negative (y<0), in that case −φy is positive due to the working of automatic stabilisers,
hence the total deﬁcit will be higher than the structural one. The symmetric reasoning holds
when the economy is in upturn.
4p =
αωb1 + αb2 − αφy − αωb2 + βpe + ϕpe
ϕ + βδ
(7)
The equilibrium output gap is found plugging inﬂation on the supply curve:
y = ϕ
µ





,S o l u t i o ni s :
y = ϕ
αωb1 + αb2 − αωb2 + βpe − peβδ
ϕ + βδ + αϕφ
(9)
This shows the positive impact of both deﬁcits on the equilibrium output gap,
i.e. the positive spillovers of each country’s deﬁcit onto the other country. The
equilibrium inﬂation is found plugging y in the expression previously identiﬁed:
p =
ϕpe + ϕpeαφ + αωb1 + α(1 − ω)b2 + βpe
ϕ + βδ + αϕφ
(10)
which instead highlights the negative externality of either country’s deﬁcit
through its eﬀect on common inﬂation. The structural deﬁcits are the only
endogenous variables still to be determined. Hence, we proceed outlining the
framework for the ﬁscal policy optimization problem.
The ﬁs c a lp o l i c yo fe a c ho ft h et w oc o u n t r i e si ss e ti no r d e rt om i n i m i z eal o s s
function. We assume that the ﬁscal authorities care about stabilizing the Union
output toward its potential level4 and about fulﬁlling the ﬁrst two requirements
of the SGP we outlined above. Therefore they incur a loss whenever they run
a structural budget deﬁcit, equal to a share η of this deﬁcit (0 <η<1)a n da
further one whenever they run a total deﬁcit larger than the threshold set by
the SGP, t. In case the threshold is overcome a proportion 0 <ρ<1 of the
excess deﬁcit must be paid by the country as a ﬁne5.
4We assume that each country cares about stabilising the currency union wide output
gap instead of the national one, as one would expect. The problem is that in this set-up the
national output gap cannot be calculated from the aggregate one.
5This set-up is a simpliﬁed version of what is actually foreseen in the Pact, in fact the ﬁne
is actually made up of a ﬁxed proportion of the country’s GDP plus a variable part which is
a constant fraction of the excess deﬁcit and there is an upper threshold beyond which the ﬁne
cannot be raised (0.5% of GDP).
Finally, the ﬁne is actually paid in reference to past and not current amounts of deﬁcit.
Our set-up is, though, in line with the literature, see Bolt (1998) and Beetsma-Uhlig (1999).
5Choosing the optimal deﬁcit, the country trades oﬀ the use of ﬁscal policy
to stabilize the output toward its structural level with the sanctions it has to
bear if the deﬁcit it runs overcomes two parallel but partly independent upper
thresholds.
Intuitively the country is faced by the risk that in order to achieve the desired
output level it has to run a structural deﬁcit, i.e. to violate directly the ﬁrst
constraint of the pact. It has a slightly more limited control on the second
constraint since it concerns the total deﬁcit, which depends on the output gap
that will eventually arise, which in turn depends also on the other country’s
structural deﬁcit. This means that the optimal equilibrium ﬁscal choice will
also depend on the other country’s choice.
The optimization strategy of the ﬁscal authorities can therefore fall into
four possible scenarios (we consider country 1, for country two the reasoning is
clearly the same):
1. The country runs a structural budget in balance or surplus, so it fulﬁlls
the ﬁrst constraint, moreover it runs a total deﬁcit not higher than the threshold,
thereby fulﬁlling also the second constraint, which means that the output gap is
high enough to avoid an excessive working of the automatic stabilizers. The loss
function is then composed only by the term capturing deviations of the output







bi ≤ 0; gi − t ≤ 0
2. The country runs a structural deﬁcit thereby violating the ﬁrst con-
straint and suﬀering the corresponding loss. On the other hand the total deﬁcit
is still lower than the threshold implying fulﬁllment of the second rule. The
loss function is therefore composed by the term on output gap deviations and
that capturing the sanctions for ﬁrst constraint’s violation. The optimization








b1 > 0; gi − t ≤ 0
3. The country runs a structural budget in balance or surplus, fulﬁlling
the ﬁrst requirement, but violates the second, running a total deﬁcit higher
than the threshold. This is a pretty unlikely scenario but cannot be ruled out
6since a structural surplus may be consistent with a total excessive deﬁcit if the
output gap is negative and large enough to produce a huge automatic stabilizers-
driven total deﬁcit. The loss function is then composed by the terms referring
to output gap stabilization and the payment of ﬁnes for running an excessive
deﬁcit, respectively. The opimization problem becomes:
Min
n




b1 ≤ 0; gi − t>0
4. The country is a ”full sinner”: it violates both constraints since it
runs a structural deﬁcit and a total deﬁcit higher than the threshold. The loss
function is then made up of three terms: output gap deviations from target and
sanctions for violation of both constraints respectively.
Min
n
σy2 + η (bi)
2 + ρ2 (gi − t)
2o
s.t.
b1 > 0; gi − t>0
3S o l v i n g t h e m o d e l
We now need to solve the optimization problem of the individual country’s
ﬁscal policy-maker.
We assume that in this two countries monetary union the two ﬁscal author-
ities independently and simultaneously set the size of their structural budget
deﬁcits, incorporating the working of this simple economy and the interest rate
rule followed by the central bank.
We need to determine the optimal deﬁcit of the ﬁrst country taking the other
country’s deﬁcit as given and considering that corner solutions can also arise.
In fact in the ﬁrst and second scenarios, as far as the ﬁr s tc o n s t r a i n ti s
concerned, the country can choose to play exactly a zero structural deﬁcit, the
maximum level allowed, or may optimize with the constraint being not binding:
i.e. running a negative structural deﬁcit.
In the remaining scenarios this would not be possible since by deﬁnition they
imply the violation of the constraint, so necessarily a strictly positive structural
deﬁcit.
7Equally, in the ﬁrst and third scenarios, the country can choose a corner
solution with respect to the second constraint: it can play a structural deﬁcit
that, given what the other country does and the resulting output gap from both
countries’ ﬁscal moves, leads to a total deﬁcit exactly equal to the threshold,
so that no ﬁnes are paid. In the remaining scenarios this option is not possible
since in that case an excessive deﬁcit is run by deﬁnition. Figure 1 synthetises
the possible moves within each scenario.
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Figure 1
The optimization problem is solved using the following procedure:
1. In the rest of this section, we calculate all the possible deﬁcit choices of
country one according to the lines of the above ﬁgure, as functions of the other
country’s deﬁcit. Those of country two are the same, the only change concerns
reversing the economic weights of the countries in the resulting formulas. No
immediate conclusions can be drawn on whether these equilibria are feasible.
Feasibility of the boundary solution requires that also the other constraint is
satisﬁed and not with equality sign, whereas for unconstrained optima it requires
that both constraints are satisﬁed and none of them with equality sign. This
feasibility check cannot be carried on at this stage since equilibria still depend
on the other country’s deﬁcit which could fall in any of the four scenarios and
in any case within each scenario. As a consequence, we cannot identify already
the move that minimizes the loss function and, so, will be chosen by the ﬁrst
country. For that purposes we need the following steps.
2. We ﬁnd the best ﬁscal responses of country one with respect to each
8of the possible moves of country two. In that case we end up with just two
numbers (and not anymore functions) for both countries’ deﬁcits. This means
that we can perform the feasibility checks for any equilibrium and once we are
left with the feasible ones we pick the one leading to the lowest loss. This step
will be performed in section 4
3. Since the results on best responses of the second country will be sym-
metric, for they are identical in everything but the economic weights, we get the
deﬁcit reaction functions of both countries, hence we can determine the Nash
equilibria. This will be done in section 5.
3.1 First scenario: the "virtuous" country
If the country chooses the ﬁrst scenario, the problem, after replacing the output
gap with its equilibrium expression and expressing the second constraint on







αωb1 + αb2 − αωb2 + βpe − peβδ
ϕ + βδ + αϕφ
¶2)
s.t b1 ≤ 0
b1 ≤
t(ϕ + βδ + αϕφ)+φϕ[αb2 (1 − ω)+βpe (1 − δ)]
ϕ + βδ + αϕφ − ϕφαω
(14)
Based on our previous discussion, we distinguish four possible cases:
case 1: structural criterion binding and total criterion not binding. In this
situation the country chooses to use all the room left by the ﬁrst constraint and,
so, plays a zero structural deﬁcit. This can be played only under the assumption
that the second constraint is also satisﬁed by such a move:
b1 =0 (15)
case 2: second constraint binding and ﬁrst not binding. In this case the
country chooses the structural deﬁcit leading to a total deﬁcit exactly equal
to the threshold, assuming that this is consistent with a structural deﬁcit in
balance or surplus.
b1 =
t(ϕ + βδ + αϕφ)+φϕ[αb2 (1 − ω)+βpe (1 − δ)]
ϕ + βδ + αϕφ(1 − ω)
(16)
case 3: no constraint binding. In this case the country does not ﬁnd it opti-
mal to use all the room for ﬁscal manoeuvre left by any of the two constraints,
9so it just plays the unconstrained optimum of this scenario. From the ﬁrst or-
der condition we then get the following solution, assuming it is consistent with
fulﬁllment of both constraints (and not with equality sign):
½
b1 =




3.2 Second scenario: structural deﬁcit







αωb1 + αb2 − αωb2 + βpe − peβδ









t(ϕ + βδ + αϕφ)+φϕ[αb2 (1 − ω)+βpe (1 − δ)]
ϕ + βδ + αϕφ − ϕφαω
we again divide the diﬀerent cases. The 0 structural deﬁcit is not feasible
now (see Figure 1). The equilibrium leading to total deﬁcit exactly equal to the
threshold is the same as before. We just need to ﬁnd the optimum in which both
constraints are not binding, which is, once the ﬁrst order condition is solved:
b1 =
−σϕ2αω [αb2 (1 − ω)+βpe (1 − δ)]
σϕ2α2ω2 + η(ϕ + βδ + αϕφ)
2 (19)
3.3 Third scenario: output-driven excessive deﬁcit









αωb1 + αb2 − αωb2 + βpe − peβδ






t(ϕ + βδ + αϕφ)+φϕ[αb2 (1 − ω)+βpe (1 − δ)]






b1 ≤ 0 (20)
b1 >
t(ϕ + βδ + αϕφ)+φϕ[αb2 (1 − ω)+βpe (1 − δ)]
ϕ + βδ + αϕφ − ϕφαω
The equilibrium exactly matching the SGP threshold for total deﬁcit is ruled
out. The zero deﬁcit equilibrium, instead, is still possible.
Solving for the unconstrained optimum we get6;
b1 =
−ϕ[αb2 (1 − ω)+B]
¡
ρ2φJ2 + σϕαω(−J + φϕαω)
¢
[Yα 2ω2 + ρ2J2](−J + φϕαω)
(21)
3.4 Fourth scenario:









αωb1 + αb2 − αωb2 + βpe − peβδ







t(ϕ + βδ + αϕφ)+φϕ[αb2 (1 − ω)+βpe (1 − δ)]






b1 > 0 (22)
b1 >
t(ϕ + βδ + αϕφ)+φϕ[αb2 (1 − ω)+βpe (1 − δ)]
ϕ + βδ + αϕφ − ϕφαω
The equilibria in which either constraint is exactly binding are unfeasible.
The unconstrained optimum is, after solving the FOC:
6where:
J = ϕ + βδ + αϕφ
B = βpe (1 − δ)
Y = σϕ2
11b1 =
−ϕ[αb2 (1 − ω)+B]
¡
ρ2φJ2 + σϕαω(−J + φϕαω)
¢
[Yα 2ω2 +( ρ2 + η)J2](−J + φϕαω)
(23)
4 Best response functions of deﬁcit
From previous sections we conclude that there are 6 possible deﬁcit choices for
each country, meaning 36 possible equilibria; the two equilibria corresponding
to either constraint being exactly binding, can in principle be played, as we
saw, in two scenarios, but from how the problem is structured we immediately
see that both of them are feasible only in one scenario, given what the other
country plays. In fact, playing a zero structural deﬁcit leads automatically
either to non excessive or excessive deﬁcit, once the move of the other country
is speciﬁed, so that it is a feasible move only on the ﬁrst or third scenario
respectively. Analogously, the structural deﬁcit consistent with total deﬁcit
equal to threshold can be either negative/zero, leading to the ﬁrst scenario, or
positive, leading to the second one. That been said, we proceed with the second
step of the procedure previously outlined:
We consider each of the six possible moves of the second country and we
calculate all the ﬁnal potential equilibria for deﬁcit, corresponding to all the
possible moves by the ﬁrst country. This allows us to verify for each of them its
feasibility. Nonetheless no conclusion could be made on the latter in general, i.e.
for any possible value of parameters. In order to have unambiguous conclusions
we focused on reasonable value ranges: expected inﬂation rate is considered to
be close to 0 (which is the target of the bank), the deﬁcit threshold close to 3
(given the 3% limit actually applied in the Euro-Area) and all the parameters
close to 0.5 (including the size parameter which implies assuming a low degree
of asymmetry between the two countries). The exception is δ which is assumed
to be slightly larger than 1 (' 1.2).
Once we ruled out unfeasible solutions, we ﬁnd the equilibrium minimizing
the ﬁrst country’s loss function.
In order to simplify notations, we label from now onwards the deﬁcit choices
of the two countries according to the two relevant dimensions: the scenario and
the case in which it may arise:
so in general we will write
b1 (i,j) (24)
meaning the equilibrium deﬁcit choice of country 1 arising in the scenario
i =1 ,...,4 and in the case j =1 ,2,3, we already used this notation in ﬁgure 1.
12In the rest of the analysis, to ease exposition and avoid too heavy notations, we
will not show all the equilibrium expressions, but just limit ourselves to the best
responses. One further remark on the procedure concerns the fact that once an
equilibrium [b1 (i,j),b 2 (h,k)] is ruled out as unfeasible, the same conclusion is
drawn for the symmetric one, i.e. for [b1 (h,k),b 2 (i,j)], since our assumption
that the economic sizes of the two countries are close to equal implies that the
two equilibria are very similar as well.
a) Best response to b2 =0=b2 (i,1),i=1 ,3, i.e. to country 2 playing zero
structural deﬁcit:
The ﬁrst country may choose to be in the ﬁrst scenario, hence it would have
the three options we outlined previously.
1. b1 (1,1) = 0
This is feasible, since both the ﬁrst and second constraints are respected. As
far as the latter is concerned we have in fact:
t(ϕ + βδ + αϕφ)+φϕβpe (1 − δ)
ϕ + βδ + αϕφ(1 − ω)
> 0=b1
this means that it will not be a feasible equilibrium in the third scenario
which implies violation of the second ﬁscal constraint: so we can already rule
out b1 (3,1).
2. b1 (1,2), i.e. it plays the structural deﬁc i tt h a tb r i n g st h et o t a ld e ﬁcit
size exactly to the threshold of second constraint. This leads to an unfeasible
equilibrium since b1 will be positive contradicting the ﬁrst constraint of the
scenario, i.e. structural deﬁcit being negative or 0. We therefore can already
infer that this equilibrium will be feasible only in the second scenario, which
implies positive structural deﬁcit.
3. We replicate this reasoning for every potential equilibrium: in this
way we see that playing b1 (1,3) is unfeasible.
If the ﬁrst country chooses to be in the second scenario, we already know
b1 (2,2) is feasible, while b1 (2,1) is not, then we need to check b1 (2,3) which
leads to a feasible equilibrium.
If the third scenario is chosen we need only to check b1 (3,3),w h i c hl e a d s
to an unfeasible equilibrium since the second constraint is not respected. If
the fourth scenario is played we just need to check the choice b1 (4,3),w h i c h
leads to an unfeasible equilibrium since the ﬁrst country would violate the ﬁrst
constraint.
So the potential equilibria are [b1 (2,2),0], [b1 (2,3),0] and [b1 (1,1),0]
leading, after calculations, to the following ranking of losses for country one’s
ﬁscal authority:
13L23 (0) <L 11 (0) <L 22 (0)
so the best response to b2 =0=b2 (i,1) is:
b1 (2,3) =
−σϕ2αωβpe (1 − δ)
σϕ2α2ω2 + η(ϕ + βδ + αϕφ)
2 (25)
meaning that ﬁrst country plays structural deﬁcit but without running ex-
cessive total deﬁcit.
F o ra l lt h eo t h e rm o v e so fc o u n t r yt w ow ep e r f o r mt h es a m ea n a l y s i s ,r e a c h i n g
the conclusions that follow.
b) Best response to the second country playing b2 (i,2),i =1 ,2, i.e.
total deﬁcit equal to threshold:
b1 (1,3) =
−αt(1 − ω)+peβ (δ − 1)
αω
(26)
meaning that the ﬁrst country plays a structural surplus and does not over-
come the threshold for total deﬁcit. This equilibrium leads toa0l o s sf o rt h e
ﬁrst country (L13 (b2 (i,2)) = 0), while all the other options lead to strictly
positive losses.
c) Best response to deﬁcit not violating constraints, i.e. to second coun-
try playing b2 =
−αωb1 − βpe + peβδ
α(1 − ω)
= b2 (1,3):
b1 (2,2) = t, meaning that the ﬁrst country plays a structural deﬁcit leading
total deﬁcit to be exactly equal to the threshold. This equilibrium leads to the
loss L22 (b2 (1,3)) = ηt27.
d) Best response to second country playing b2 (2,3) i.e. structural deﬁcit
without violating the constraint on excessive total deﬁcit:
b1 (2,3) =
−Yα ω[αb2 (2,3)(1 − ω)+B]
Yα 2ω2 + ηJ2 = −
ωYαB
ηJ2 + Yα 2ω
(27)
meaning that the ﬁrst country plays a structural deﬁcit but runs a total
deﬁcit strictly lower than the threshold.
e) Best response to second country playing b2 (3,3), i.e. total deﬁcit
violating the second constraint while running a structural budget surplus.
7One remark concerns the case [b1 (1,3),b 2 (1,3)]: solving the corresponding system we
see that it is undetermined so we rule out this equilibrium.
14In this case we end up with two feasible equilibria: [b1 (3,3),b 2 (3,3)] and
[b1 (2,2),b 2 (3,3)]. Nonetheless, some further remarks can be done for both of
them.
The equilibrium [b1 (3,3),b 2 (3,3)] is feasible in principle but it is very un-
likely to arise, since if both countries use a structural surplus they get a strongly
negative output gap, which basically means hurting themselves, since they get
a recession which is so deep to revert the sign of total deﬁcit (due to automatic
stabilizers) to positive and bigger in absolute value than the pact’s threshold.
This strategy could be optimal only with very high inﬂation expectations and
with demand more strongly aﬀected by interest rate than by ﬁscal stimulus: in
that case negative structural deﬁcit lowers inﬂation and interest rate leading
to a positive impact on the output gap more than oﬀsetting the negative one
implied by the direct demand channel. This is intuitively a very unlikely event
so we exclude this equilibrium.
Hence, we are left with b1 (2,2), but we can exclude this strategy too. In fact,
if the other country plays b2 (3,3), the output gap must be strongly negative,
since, although it plays a structural surplus, it runs an excessive total deﬁcit.
Now, since the size of automatic stabilizers is by assumption equal for the two
countries, the ﬁrst country, which runs a structural deﬁcit, must end up af o r t i o r i
with an even higher total deﬁcit than the second one, so it is not possible that
it avoids violating the second constraint.
We conclude that there is no feasible response to the second country playing
b2 (3,3).
f) Best response to second country playing b2 (4,3), i.e. a deﬁcit violating
both constraints:
In this case all possible equilibria turn out to be unfeasible. Therefore, we
conclude that there is no feasible response to country 2 making this move.
5 The Nash equilibrium
We can now sum up the previous results through the following ﬁgure:
15 
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Summing up, there are only t h r e ep o s s i b l em o v e sf o rt h eﬁrst country, which
can be represented by the following set:
Θ1 =
½
b1 (1,3) = f (b2 (i,2));b1 (2,3) = f (b2 (i,1) = 0,b 2 (2,3));
b1 (2,2) = t = f (b2 (1,3))
¾
(28)
We call this set the ﬁscal reaction function of the ﬁrst country.
This result holds symmetrically, for the reasons previously outlined, for the
second country. Its ﬁscal reaction function therefore is:
Θ2 =
½
b2 (1,3) = f (b1 (i,2));b2 (2,3) = f (b1 (i,1) = 0,b 1 (2,3));
b2 (2,2) = t = f (b1 (1,3))
¾
(29)
We can represent graphically the best responses or ﬁscal reaction functions
of the two countries, taking, for simpliﬁcation, the case of symmetric countries
(ω = 1
2):
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Figure 3
Since the two countries are just playing Nash with each other we end up
with three possible Nash equilibria:
Σ = {[b2 (1,3),b 1 (2,2)];[b2 (2,3),b 1 (2,3)],[b2 (2,2),b 1 (1,3)]} (30)
Clearly the ﬁrst and the last equilibria are just the symmetric of each other.
We now close the model determining the values of economic fundamentals
in the Union in all three equilibria and interpreting the results.
If the equilibrium is
·
b1 (2,2) = t,b2 (1,3) =
−αtω + peβ (δ − 1)
α(1 − ω)
¸
the equilibrium output gap is:
y [b1 (2,2),b 2 (1,3)] = (31)
ϕ
αωb1 (2,2) + αb2 (1,3) − αωb2 (1,3) + βpe − peβδ
ϕ + βδ + αϕφ
=0
The equilibrium inﬂation is determined by
p =
ϕpe + ϕpeαφ + αωb1 (2,2) + α(1 − ω)b2 (1,3) + βpe
ϕ + βδ + αϕφ
=⇒ p = pe (32)
17The intuition behind this equilibrium is then the following. One country
runs a structural deﬁcit up to the point in which it exactly hits the threshold
for the total deﬁcit, so it violates the ﬁrst constraint of the Pact, and exploits all
the room for ﬁscal expansion left by the second constraint, without violating it.
The other country reacts with a structural ﬁscal surplus, in order to oﬀset the
impact of the other country’s policy on output gap, untill it brings the latter to
0, as the ﬁscal objective function implies.
In a sense there is a division of labour between one country spending a lot
and the other compensating for that.
Since the output gap is zero, structural and total deﬁcit coincide, so the
ﬁrst country chooses a deﬁcit exactly equal to the SGP threshold and incurs
a loss due to violation of ﬁrst constraint and proportional to the threshold:
L1 (b1 (2,2)) = ηt2.
The other country, instead, is better oﬀ, since it runs a surplus and so it
does not violate any of the constraints, besides it gets a zero output gap. As a
consequence it is in the best possible situation with a zero loss. We therefore
observe that the higher the SGP threshold (i.e. the softer the second constraint
is), the higher the loss for the ﬁrst country, since it will violate the ﬁrst constraint
to a larger extent.
It is important to observe that in this case the output gap goes to 0 whatever
the inﬂation expectations of agents are. In fact the second country, besides
oﬀsetting the partner’s policy, also increases its deﬁcit proportionally to inﬂation
expectations in order to undo completely the negative eﬀect of the latter on
actual inﬂation, which in turn would lead to higher interest rates set by the
bank and, so, to lower output gap. Yet, inﬂation expectations turn out to be
rational by construction, i.e. the inﬂation rate is equal to the expected one
simply through the inﬂation equilibrium expression, without need of assuming
rational expectations from the start.
As a consequence, this situation is consistent with any possible inﬂation
rate: the output gap will always be 0 and the losses of the two countries end up
unchanged since they just care for the output stabilization and not at all about
inﬂation, which is of course a very strong assumption.
In order to close the model we therefore can reasonably say that, since all
inﬂation rates are indiﬀerent for the countries, the central bank, which by man-
date must keep inﬂation as close as possible to its target (0), will choose a zero



















18therefore the equilibrium deﬁcit of country two becomes:
b2 (1,3) =






Finally, we found that also the reversed equilibrium, meaning the second
country playing the deﬁcit threshold and the ﬁrst country compensating, ·
b1 (1,3) =
−αt(1 − ω)+pβ (δ − 1)
αω
,b 2 (2,2) = t
¸
, is also a Nash equilib-
rium. All the previous results hold in this case as well.
If the last equilibrium is played:

b1 (2,3) = −
ωαβpe (1 − δ)σϕ2
ηJ2 + α2σϕ2ω
,b 2 (2,3) =
−βpe (1 − δ)σϕ2 ¡










y [b1 (2,3),b 2 (2,3)] =
ϕβpe (1 − δ)ηJ
£
ηJ2 + ωσϕ2 (1 − ω)α2¤
[ηJ2 + σϕ2α2ω]
h
σϕ2α2 (1 − ω)
2 + ηJ2
i < 0 (35)
Both countries violate the ﬁrst constraint running a structural deﬁcit, mean-
ing that the burden of ﬁscal expansion to stimulate the aggregate economy is
shared. Yet they do not do that up to the point of exactly hitting the threshold
for total deﬁcit, so the room left by the second constraint is not entirely ex-
ploited. They both end up in a second best solution since the output gap turns
out to be negative and that implies, together with sanctions for ﬁrst constraint’s
violation, positive loss for the two of them. A free-riding problem occurs: the
countries do not manage to split the ﬁscal burden to get a zero output gap.
Each country is afraid that the other runs a too low deﬁcit in order to enjoy
economic upturn paying a lower price than its partner in terms of sanctions for
violation of the ﬁrst constraint.
On top of that we observe that both countries’ deﬁcit is just proportional
to inﬂation expectations: the rationale is, again, that of oﬀsetting the nega-
tive impact on output gap of higher interest rates, driven by higher inﬂation
expectations.
Not surprisingly, the two deﬁcit expressions just depend on the sanctions for
the violation of the ﬁr s tc o n s t r a i n t( η), while those linked to the second one (ρ)
do not appear, since it is not binding.
196 Simulations and robustness analysis
In this section we perform some simulations on our model to check whether our
solutions, which, as we stressed, are actually valid for a limited range of values
for parameters, are robust to some changes in the numbers associated to them.
We ﬁrst plugged in values close to the baseline scenario we referred to in the
above analysis: all values of structural parameters equal to 0.5 except δ set to
1.2. This corresponds to the values used (except for δ) in one of the simulations
p e r f o r m e di nB e e t s m a - D e b r u n - K l a s s e n( 2 0 0 1) for a similar model. The values
of the parameters attached to the two constraints of the pact are set to 0.5 as
well, meaning a pretty high degree of stringency of those requirements (they
can be interpreted as implying that 50% of the excess with respect to the two
thresholds for deﬁcits is paid as a ﬁne). In this scenario we distinguish two cases
b a s e do nt h ev a l u eo fi n ﬂation expectations: they are set to 0 in the former and
to 2% in the latter. Finally we do not assume symmetry of the two countries
in terms of economic size to make our results more realistic with respect to the
s i t u a t i o ni nt h eE u r o - A r e a .T h e r e f o r ew es e tω = 2
3, i.e. the ﬁrst country is twice
as large as the second one. We then recalculated the deﬁcit Nash equilibria in
both cases, corresponding to the ﬁrst and second column of the following ﬁgure
respectively.
In case of 2% inﬂation expectation (second column) we ﬁn dt h es a m et h r e e
equilibria we previously found. We see that the symmetric equilibrium (i.e. both
countries playing the same deﬁcit strategy) basically implies very low deﬁcit
rates (0.01% and 0.005% of GDP for the two countries respectively). In the zero
inﬂation expectation case (ﬁrst column) we see that we do not have anymore the
equilibrium b1 (2,3),b 2 (2,3): it is replaced by the one in which both countries
play 0 structural deﬁcits: this is no surprise, since the symmetric equilibrium has
both deﬁcits linear in inﬂation expectation, so when the latter is 0 both deﬁcits
go to 0 as well. In the fourth row we show the output gaps corresponding to the
diﬀerent deﬁcit equilibria. In the lower rows we performed an exercise of welfare
ranking of the three equilibria, based on an utilitarian welfare function: we found
the sum of the two countries’ losses associated to each of the three equilibria
and, in the last row, we identiﬁed the equilibrium which minimizes that sum.
In both cases the symmetric equilibrium is the best one, moreover, with zero
inﬂation expectation, it leads to the ﬁrst best situation of zero cumulative loss.
These results fully conﬁrm our previous ﬁnding.
In the third and fourth columns the values are the same as before except for
the two ﬁscal rules’ parameters which are both set to 0,1.T h i si sam o r er e a l i s t i c
situation since, in the actual implementation of the SGP, the ﬁr s tc o n s t r a i n ti s
not very strictly adhered to, while the rules on excessive deﬁcit can be roughly
approximated by assuming that 10% of the excess of deﬁcit over threshold is
actually paid as a ﬁne (see Bolt (1999)). So the pact is now supposed to be less
strict.
20The three Nash equilibria are the same as in the previous scenario, with
the same distinction between 0 and 2% inﬂation expectations. In the latter
case the symmetric equilibrium implies higher deﬁcits than in the similar case
with stricter pact, this is no surprise: when the sanction is softer both countries
violate the ﬁrst constraint to a larger extent. The asymmetric equilibria are
instead identical to the case of tougher pact since their expressions, as we saw,
do not depend on the rules’ parameters on the ﬁscal loss function but just on
the deﬁcit threshold. The symmetric equilibria are still those leading to the
highest welfare.
I nt h el a s tt w oc o l u m n sw em a k eam o r es i g n i ﬁc a n tc h a n g e :w eu s et h ev a l u e s
for structural parameters taken from the baseline simulation performed in Buti-
Van den Noord (2003), who check a model similar to ours. Surprise inﬂation
as well as deﬁcit have now a higher impact on output while ﬁscal authorities
care much more about output stabilization. The parameters on the Pact rules
are kept to 0.1. Two cases are distinguished: inﬂation expectations equal to 2%
and to 6% respectively.
The picture changes then substantially: no more symmetric equilibria arise
a n di nb o t hc a s e sb1 (2,3),b 2 (1,1) becomes a Nash equilibrium, so the ﬁrst coun-
try violating the ﬁrst constraint and the second (smaller) playing zero deﬁcit.
The usual asymmetric equilibria stay in the case of 2% inﬂation expectation,
while in the 6% case only one is kept: b1 (2,2),b 2 (1,3) but not the reversed one.
Intuitively when inﬂation is higher there is need that the big country (which is
the ﬁrst one) and not the small one stimulates the economy to oﬀset the tough
monetary policy stance due to high inﬂation expectations. b1 (2,3),b 2 (1,1) is
in both cases the equilibrium with the highest welfare, moreover it implies a
ﬁrst country’s structural deﬁcit signiﬁcantly higher than in the best equilibria
of the other cases: 0.51%a n d1.54% of GDP with 2 and 6% inﬂation expectation
respectively. It is interesting to notice that in this scenario either, the option of
violating the second constraint of the pact is never adopted.
21 B-D-K 
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7C o n c l u s i o n s
We can now sum up the results of the exercise we carried on.
We built up a simple model with a two-countries monetary union in which the
two ﬁscal policy-makers simultaneously choose their deﬁcit taken that chosen by
the other one as given. They are sanctioned if they do not fulﬁll two ﬁscal rules
close to those of the Stability and Growth Pact and concerning the structural
and total deﬁcit respectively.
The (very few) analysis carried on in the literature neglected the fact that
those rules are asymmetric, i.e. the sanction/ﬁne is raised whenever the deﬁcit is
higher than a threshold, but not when it is lower. In the current paper this issue
22is analyzed allowing explicitly for this asymmetry in the ﬁscal policy-makers’
loss function.
We therefore divided the ﬁscal optimization problem in four scenarios, based
on whether either, both or none of the two SGP constraints is violated by each
country. Then we calculated the three Nash equilibria of deﬁcit.
The ﬁrst two are each the symmetric of the other, and they correspond to
the case in which one country runs a structural deﬁc i tu pt ot h ep o i n ti nw h i c hi t
exactly hits the threshold for the total deﬁcit, so it violates the ﬁrst constraint
of the Pact and exploits all the room for ﬁscal expansion left by the second
constraint. On the other hand the other country responds with a structural
ﬁscal surplus in order to oﬀset the impact of the other country’s policy on
output gap, untill it brings the latter to 0. Moreover it sets its ﬁscal policy so
that it undoes the negative eﬀect of higher inﬂation expectations on the output
gap. The zero output gap, in turn, implies rational inﬂation expectations. In a
sense there is a division of labour between one country spending a lot and the
other compensating for that. The country playing structural deﬁcit bears a loss
because of violation of the ﬁrst constraint while the other gets to the ﬁrst-best
situation with zero loss.
In the third equilibrium the two countries play the same ﬁscal strategy:
they both violate the ﬁrst constraint running a structural deﬁcit, but they do
not exploit all the room for manoeuvre left by the second constraint. They
share equally the burden of ﬁscal expansion to stimulate the aggregate economy.
Nonetheless they end up in a second best solution since the output gap turns
out to be negative. The ﬁrst best is prevented by free-riding: each country
is afraid that the other runs a too low deﬁcit in order to reap the beneﬁts of
higher output paying a lower price in terms of sanctions for violation of the ﬁrst
constraint.
In the ﬁrst equilibrium we see that we end up with zero output gap and zero
inﬂation, but we could get exactly the same results with both countries playing
0d e ﬁcits and so both enjoying zero losses (see appendix). The Pact does not let
this ﬁrst best outcome arise: the uncoordinated setting of ﬁscal policies under
the pact’s constraints lead either to ﬁscal expansion by one country, totally
undone by the other, leading to an ineﬃcient loss born by the former, or by a
symmetric but softer ﬁscal expansion which leads to an ineﬃciently low ﬁscal
stimulus which is not enough to oﬀset the negative impact on output of positive
inﬂation expectations.
The simulations and robustness analysis performed in the last section show
that the above results are quite robust to changes in the extent to which the
two ﬁscal rules are binding, but less robust with respect to changes in the values
of structural parameters of the model: the symmetric deﬁcit equilibrium seems
to disappear if we deviate from the baseline scenario.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Symmetric Nash equilibrium with rational expecta-
tions
We now reconsider the equilibrium [b2 (2,3),b 1 (2,3)] adding the assumption
that the private agents have rational expectations, i.e. they are able to perfectly
foresee (in this context where no stochastic component is present) the inﬂation
rate, so we have p = pe which means that also the output gap (through the
supply function) will end up being 0. Moreover, replacing pe with p in the
equilibrium inﬂation expression we see that it can hold only if p =0 ,which leads
to: y [b1 (2,3),b 2 (2,3)] = b1 (2,3) = b2 (2,3) = 0
since they are all linear in p. This means that this equilibrium, unlike the
asymmetric one, leads to the ﬁrst-best solution when inﬂation rational expecta-
tions are assumed: zero output gap and zero deﬁcits lead to zero losses for both
countries.
258.2 The ﬁrst-best solution: zero deﬁcits by both countries
In this sub-section we consider the ﬁrst best situation in a general framework
w h e r ew ed on o tm a k ea n ya s s u m p t i o no ni n ﬂation expectations.
First-best means zero losses for both countries, which in turn implies zero
output gap, which in turn means that structural and total deﬁcit coincide.
y [b1,b 2]=ϕ
αωb1 + αb2 − αωb2 + βpe − peβδ
ϕ + βδ + αϕφ




(−βpe − αωb1 + βδpe) (36)
Zero losses for both countries also mean no violation whatsoever of the con-
straints of the stability and growth pact, i.e. negative or zero structural deﬁcit
(which implies automatically no violation of the second constraint either)
Zero output gap also implies p = pe from the supply side of the economy, so
rational expectations are again endogenously determined by the model with no
need of assuming them exogenously in the ﬁrst place.
Than conditions for ﬁrst best are summarized by the following system:
b2 =
−αωb1 + βp(δ − 1)
α − αω
(37)
bi ≤ 0 i =1 ,2
One solution is clearly b1 = b2 =0 , which leads in turn, from equilibrium
inﬂation expression, to p =0
Is there any possible solution with p 6=0 ?
if p>0 ⇒ b2 ≤ 0 ⇔ b1 > 0 so this solution is ruled out
if p<0 ⇒ b2 =0⇔ b1 =
βp(δ − 1)
αω




{b1 = b2 = p =0 },
½





















<b 2 ≤ 0
¾
26So either there is no inﬂation and zero deﬁcits from both countries or there
can be deﬂation with either country running structural surplus while the other
runs a balanced budget or with both countries running a surplus.
That comes from the fact that the two countries do not care about inﬂation
per se, so deﬂation can lead to zero loss since they can undo the eﬀects on output
gap, which occurs through a negative interest rate, using a budget surplus, which
they can do indeﬁnitely without running any punishment from the pact.
Nonetheless, if we replicate the reasoning on the zero inﬂation target of the
bank we outlined commenting the asymmetric Nash equilibrium, we can rule
out all the deﬂationary ﬁrst-best cases:
In fact from the demand channel we must have:
yD = α
·
ωb1 +( 1− ω)
βp(δ − 1) − αωb1
α − αω
¸
− β (i − p)=0
if the bank then sets i =0 , foreseeing zero inﬂation, that will actually arise:
yD = α
·
ωb1 +( 1− ω)




⇒ βδp =0⇒ p =0
which is consistent, as we saw, only with zero deﬁcits by both countries.
We conclude that the general ﬁrst-best equilibrium is: {b1 = b2 = p =0= ⇒ L1 = L2 =0 }
27